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This article shares a method & tool developped by Intrinsec to reconstruct attack path using Microsoft Protection logs. Enjoy reading & hunting !


During incident response, CERT Intrinsec performs investigation so as to find indicators of compromise and reconstruct the attack path followed by the attackers. Amongst many approaches, it is possible to build that path by leveraging Microsoft Protection logs to spot tactics and techniques. These logs are named MPLog-*.log and are located under the directory C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Support\. They are operational logs and contain different information such as scanned resources and threats detected (command lines, binaries, etc). They are generated by the antimalware engine.


Link to the tool and instruction at the end of the article.

About log entries

CERT-Intrinsec has identified several input data types that can help during forensic investigations. The data listed below is not exhaustive and only relevant data is presented. The following tables provide information about log entries structures.

One-line entries

Name of the log entry Data Structure Explanation
Lowfi <DATE_TIME> Engine:command line reported as lowfi: <FULL_PATH_COMMAND_LINE> These log entries provided by this engine tracks command lines and is very useful to spot malicious activities.
EMS Scan <DATE_TIME> Engine:EMS scan for process: <PROCESS_NAME> pid: <PID>, sigseq: <SIGSEQ>, sendMemoryScanReport: <SEND_MEMORY_SCAN_REPORT>, source: <SOURCE> The EMS engine that scan for processes is part of Windows Defender’s memory scanning engine.
Setting Original File name <DATE_TIME> Engine:Setting original file name <ORIGINAL_FILE_NAME_FULL_PATH> for <FULL_PATH_FILENAME>, hr=<HR> This engine might be responsible for renaming entries in cache files.
Command line reported as threat <DATE_TIME> Engine:command line reported as threat: <FULL_PATH_COMMAND> This engine identifies malicious command lines.
ProcessImageName* <DATE_TIME> ProcessImageName: <PROCESS_NAME>, Pid: <PID>, TotalTime: <TOTAL_TIME>, Count: <COUNT>, MaxTime: <MAX_TIME>, MaxTimeFile: <MAX_TIME_FILE>, EstimatedImpact: <ESTIMATED_IMPACT>% These log entries provide information about estimated impact of scan on running processes.
DETECTION_ADD <DATE_TIME> DETECTION_ADD#2 <THREAT_TYPE> <COMMAND_LINE> This entry logs threat detection and provides useful information such as threat type, command line, process id, etc.
DETECTIONEVENT MPSOURCE_SYSTEM <DATE_TIME> DETECTIONEVENT MPSOURCE_SYSTEM <THREAT_TYPE> <COMMAND_LINE> This entry logs detection events and provides useful information, especially threat type and command line.

* ProcessImageName fields description

Field Name Description
ProcessImageName Process image name
Pid ID of process
TotalTime The cumulative duration in milliseconds spent in scans of files accessed by this process
Count The number of scanned files accessed by this process
MaxTime The duration in milliseconds in the longest single scan of a file accessed by this process
MaxTimeFile The path of the file accessed by this process for which the longest scan of MaxTime duration was recorded
EstimatedImpact The percentage of time spent in scans for files accessed by this process out of the period in which this process experienced scan activity

Multi-line entries

Resource scan

The Resource Scan log entry can help identify malicious activities by providing information about resources identified as threats.

Begin Resource ScanScan ID:<SCAN_ID>Scan Source:<SCAN_SOURCE>Start Time:<START_TIME>End Time:<END_TIME>Explicit resource to scanResource Schema:<RESOURCE_SCHEMA>Resource Path:<RESOURCE_PATH>Result Count:<RESULT_COUNT>Threat Name:<THREAT_NAME>ID:<THREAT_NAME_ID>Severity:<SEVERITY>Number of Resources:<RESOURCE_NUMBER>Resource Schema:<RESOURCE_SCHEMA>Resource Path:<RESOURCE_PATH>Extended Info - SigSeq:<SIGSEQ>Extended Info - SigSha:<SIGSHA>End Scan

BM Telemetry

The Behavior Monitoring module monitors file processes, file and registry changes, and other events on endpoints for suspicious and known malicious activities.

BEGIN BM telemetry
TelemetryName:<TELEMETRY_NAME: Behavior:Win32/[...]>
END BM telemetry

Threat Actions

The Threat Actions module logs the different actions performed on threats (removal, quarantine, etc).

Beginning threat actions
Start time:<DATA_TIME>
Threat Name:<THREAT_NAME>
Action:<ACTION: Remove|Quarantine>
Resource action complete:<RESOURCE_ACTION_COMPLETE>
Schema:<SCHEMA: File|Folder>
Resource refcount:<RESOURCE_REFCOUNT>
Resource action complete:<RESOURCE_ACTION_COMPLETE: Removal>
Resource refcount:<RESOURCE_REFCOUNT>
File owner:<ACCOUNT>
File cleaned/removed successfully
Action remove successful on file:<FULL_PATH_FILE_NAME>
Resource action complete:<RESOURCE_ACTION_COMPLETE: Removal>
Resource refcount:<RESOURCE_REFCOUNT>
Threat result:<THREAT_RESULT>
Threat status flags:<THREAT_STATUS_FLAGS>
Finished threat actions

Exclusion list

The Exclusion engine generates an exclusion list for the Real Time Protection module.

<DATE_TIME> [Exclusion] BEGIN: Starting to generate RTP exclusion list ...
<DATE_TIME> [Exclusion] END: Successfully generated RTP exclusion list.


With dataset analyzed, CERT Intrinsec has identified 5 different log entries for the Mini-filter engine Unsuccessful scan status, First scan on a volume, MpQueryLoadedDrivers called, OpenWithoutRead notification and Blocked File. The most relevant ones seem to be Unsuccessful scan status and Blocked File.

<DATE_TIME> [Mini-filter] Unsuccessful scan status: <FULL_PATH_FILENAME> Process: <PROCESS_NAME>, Status: <STATUS>, State: <STATE>, ScanRequest <SCANREQUEST>, FileId: <FILE_ID>, Reason: <REASON>, IoStatusBlockForNewFile: <IO_STATUS_BLOCK_FOR_NEW_FILE>, DesiredAccess: <DESIRED_ACCESS>, FileAttributes: <FILE_ATTRIBUTES>, ScanAttributes: <SCAN_ATTRIBUTES>, AccessStateFlags: <ACCESS_STATE_FLAGS>, BackingFileInfo: <BACKING_FILE_INFO>,
<DATE_TIME> [Mini-filter] First scan on a volume: <FULL_PATH_FILENAME>
<DATE_TIME> [Mini-filter] MpQueryLoadedDrivers called. bytesToCopy = <BYTES_TO_COPY>, ntStatus = <NT_STATUS>
<DATE_TIME> [Mini-filter] OpenWithoutRead notification (607, 10067, <FULL_PATH_FILENAME>) sent successfully.
<DATE_TIME> [Mini-filter] Blocked file: <FULL_PATH_FILENAME>. Process: <PROCESS_FULL_PATH_NAME>, Status: <STATUS>, State: <STATE>, ScanRequest <SCANREQUEST>, FileId: <FILEID>, Reason: <REASON>, IoStatusBlockForNewFile: <IO_STATUS_BLOCK_FOR_NEW_FILE>, DesiredAccess: <DESIRED_ACCESS>, FileAttributes: <FILE_ATTRIBUTES>, ScanAttributes: <SCAN_ATTRIBUTES>, AccessStateFlags: <ACCESS_STATE_FLAGS>, BackingFileInfo: <BACKING_FILE_INFO>,

Microsoft Protection Logs Parser

CERT Intrinsec uses Microsoft Protection logs when dealing with ransomwares or more advanced threats. In order to speed up the investigation and improve its forensic capabilities, it decided to write a script that extracts useful information from specific log entries within MPLog files. This parser is developed in Python and is looking for specific log patterns, that have been relevant during past investigations. It requires a folder containing log files and a folder that will store CSV output files thus created.

mplog_parser is available here : https://github.com/Intrinsec/mplog_parser.

MPLog Execution trace

You can find below two examples of MPLogs parser output, including lowfi entries and threat actions:

MLogs output

The MPLogs parser helps to identify malicious command lines from lowfi logs entries. You can see detections of discovery commands, tracks of lsass process dumping and the use of PsLoggedOn (SysInternals Tools).

MPlogs Threat Actions

Threat action output identifies lsass process dumping activity and the presence of a malicious DLL, related to Cobalt Strike tools.


Microsoft Protection logs allows to spot many techniques used by adversaries, recording command lines or executed binaries. The following table sums up these techniques.

Tactic Technique Technique ID
Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003
Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001
Execution Windows Management Instrumentation T1047
Persistence Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts T1078.002
Defense Evasion Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001
Defense Evasion Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070.004
Credential Access OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001
Credential Access OS Credential Dumping: NTDS T1003.003
Discovery Account Discovery T1087
Discovery Domain Trust Discovery T1482
Discovery Network Share Discovery T1135
Discovery System Information Discovery T1082
Discovery File and Directory Discovery T1083
Discovery Remote System Discovery T1018
Collection Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001
Collection Email Collection T1114
Collection Data from Network Shared Drive T1039

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